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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
HUBERT \VOLFE, SHIRLEY \VOLFE,
his wife, ELLIOTT \VOLFE, KA YLA
\YOLFE, and ~[ERRILL STRONG, Copartners, doing business under the fir1n
name and style of WOLFE'S DEPART~IEXT STORE and 'VOLFE'S DEPART:JIEXT STORE, a copartnership,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.
7153

vs.
~ARAH

'YHITE and JA1IES L. \VHITE,
her husband,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

This appeal is to review the action of the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in ~ustain
ing defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint and amendments thereto and its judgment dismissing the said complaint and an1endments thereto and
dismissing the above-entitled action, said judgment was
entered and filed Nove1nber 15, 1947. (R. 56, 57) Defendants filed special demurrers and motions to strike,
but the same were overruled and denied by the trial
eourt. (R. 56, 57)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises from plaintiffs' claim that defendants breached certain terms of a written lease agreement under which defendants leased to plaintiffs property situated in the business district of Salt Lake City,
Utah. Since the case below was disposed of upon general
demurrer, we shall for the convenience of the court set
forth the lease, the complaint, amendments thereto and
exhibits verbatim.
The plaintiffs and appellants are the lessees, and
the defendants and respondents are the lessors but hereafter will be designated merely as plaintiffs and defendants.
The lease ,is attached to the complaint as Exhibit
"A," (R. 8), and reads as follows:
EXHIBIT ''A''
LEASE
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE made and
executed at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 19th
day of February, 1945, by and between SARAH
WHITE, owner of the premises hereinafter described, and JAMES L. WHITE, her husband,
· of 'Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to
as ''Lessors,'' and HUBERT WOLFE, SHIRLEY WOLFE, his wife, ELLIOTT WOLFE,
KAYLA WOLFE and MERRILL STRONG, copartners, all of Salt Lake City, Utah, doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah, under the firm name
and style of "Wolfe's Department Store," which
co-partnership is also bound in this lease as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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·

.. \Volfe'~ Deparhnent Store," a
b~· HUBERT \YOLFE, nmnaging

copartnership,
partner, here-

inafter referred to as ··Lessees,''

\V I T N E

~

S E T H:

That said parties do 1uutually covenant, grant
and agree to and with earh other as follows:
(1)

Lessors do hereby grant, lease and den1ise
unto the Lessees, for a term to commence on the
I th day of ~larch, 1945, and to end on the 31st
day of ~[ay, 1956, the following described premises
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, to-wit:
The one-story building, basement and
balcony, commonly designated as 248-256
South State Street, having dimensions of approxilnately 78 feet 3 inches on State ~treet,
by 123 feet 6 inches in depth.
together with the use of the right-of-way Immediately south of the Keeley store at 260 Sou_th
State Street, and together with the use of the loading platform in the r·ear of the premises· herein
leased, it being understood that the buildings and
parking space West of said loading platform are
now leased to and are being used by Keeley's In"
corporated and other tenants, who have the exclusive right to use s.aid parking space. Said
premises are to be occupied for the conduct of
a Inercantile business, which will not compete or
conflict with the business now being conducted by
Keeley's Incorporated at 260 South 'State Street.
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(2)

The Lessees shall pay to the Lessors as rent
for said premises during the ter1n thereof as follows:
The total sum of Eighty Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars ($80,130.00), payable' in
monthly installments of Five Hundred Fifty Dollars ($550.00) each for the months commencing
March 7, 1945 to June 6, 1946, a period of fifteen
(15) months, the sum of Four Hundred Eighty
Dollars ( $480.00) for the period commencing June
7th, 1946, and ending June 30th, 1946, and Six
Hundred Dollars ( $600.00) per month for the nine
years and eleven months period commencing July
1st, 1946 and ending May 31st, 1956, each in advance on the first day of each and every month
during said period.
(3)

The rental for the last ten year term of this
lease is fixed at Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00)
per month, upon the express condition that the
Lessees will, and they hereby agree to, at their
own expense, make permanent improvements to
the building herein leased, including the installation of a first-class front therein, which improvements shall cost not less, but 1nay cost more than,
Ten Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00). Said Ten
Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00) shall not include
the cost of trade fixtures, or any other removable
fixtures, but shall include only the cost of permanent improvements to the building. If it should
develop that necessary permanent improvement~
can be made for less than Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,0QO.OO), then the rent for the last ten year
term of this lease shall be increased Ten Doilars
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~$10.00) per uwnth, or fraction thereof, for every
thousand dollars, or frartion thereof, that the
pennanent ilnproven1ents cost less than Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), and for the purpose of detennining the fart, Lessees agree at the
c01npletion of said pennanent improven1ents to
furnish Lessors with an iteinized statmnent of the
cost of pennanent improvements made as aforesaid. The said pennanent ilnprovements are to be
con1menced on or before June 7th, 1946, or as soon
thereafter as Government restrictions will perInit. Rental shall be paid during the time said improveinents are being made. All such pennanent
ilnprovenients and construction shall be completed
free and clear of all liens and claims of contractors, sub-contractors, mechanics, laborers, nlaterial n1en and other persons having si1nilar
clain1s. All such permanent improvements shall
upon installation become part of the realty and
shall be surrendered to the Lessors in good order
and condition as when constructed, reasonable
"-ear and tear and damage by fire or other casualty excepted. After said permanent improvements
are n1ade, it is agreed that further structural
changes shall not be made to said premises by the
Lessees, without first obtaining the written consent of the Lessors, which consent Lessors covenant will not unreasonably be withheld.

(4)

Lessees shall also pay all charges for light,
heat, electricity, gas and water consumed upon the
den1ised premises during the term of this lease.
(5)

It is understood and agreed that the premises
herein leased are presently leased to Daniel StewSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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art doing business as ''Stewart Novelty Compa~y," until June 6, 1946, at Five Hundred :B--,ifty
Dollars ($550.00) per month, and that this lease i~
1nade subject to that lease. It is further agreed
that the Lessors shall collect the rents from Stewart Novelty Company for the term ending June
6, 1946, and providing the said rents are paid by
Stewart Novelty Company, it is agreed that the
Lessees will have no further obligation under thi~
lease for the term ending June 6, 1946, and likewise will not be ,entitled to the possession of said
premises for said term. If Stewart Novelty defaults in the payrnent of rent, however, then the
responsibility of the Lessees for the term ending June 6, 1946 will commence, and in case of
such default the Lessees agree to pay said rental
in accordance with the terms hereof, and in such
event will be entitled to all of the Lessors' rights
and re1nedies against Stewart Novelty Company
by reason of said default.
(6)

In consideration of the r,ental herein fixed,
the Lessees agree to and do hereby accept said
premises in the condition and state of repair they
are now in, and foff" the last ten ye,ars of this Lease,
all improvements, upkeep and repairs, of every
kind and nature whatsoever, regardless of the extent thereof and whether the same be ordinary or
extraordinary, and regardless of how the same
may be necessitated, except as hereinafter stated,
including repair and upkeep of the heating plant
and replacement of all glass, including plate glass
broken, -are to be made at the expense of the
Lessees. If pl~te glass iU:surance is carried, it shall
be carried at the expense of the Lessees.
I

,

•
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(7)

Lessees agree that at the expiration of the
term o( this lease they will ~~ield and deliver up
the said de1nised premises to the Lessors, in as
good order and condition as the san1e will be after
the initial pel'lnanent i1nproven1ents above contenlplated are completed, reasonable use and wear
thereof and damage by the elements excepted.
Lessees agree to occupy said pren1ises in a lawful 1nanner and to keep the water pipes and their
connections and sewage pipes and their connections upon said pre1nises at all times in good condition and state of repair.
(8)

For the entire term of this lease the Lessors
shall have the obligation to keep the roof of the
leased premises in good condition and repair; to
pay general taxes and lighting ass·essments levied
against said property, all fire insurance premiums.
and premiums on any other insurance the owner
elects to carry.
(9)

Lessees covenant and agree not to assign,
transfer, hypothecate or mortgag·e this lease, or
any interest therein, without first' obtaining the
written consent of the Lessors, which consent Lessors covenant wiJl not unreasonably be withheld.
If such consent is given by the Lessors, it is understood and agreed that the Lessees shall continue
to ren1ain liable under all the terms, covenants
and conditions of this lease.
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(10)
If the rent above reserved, or any part thereof, shall be unpaid on the date whereon the same
is due and payable, and for fifteen days thereafter,
or if default shall be made in any of the covenants
herein contained to be kept by the Lessees, their
heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, it shall
and may be lawful for the said Lessors, their heirs,
executors, administrators, agents, attorneys or
assigns, to take possession of the demised premises, and every part thereof, either with or without legal process, and without notice to quit to
re-enter and the same again to repossess and enjoy as in their first and former estate.

(11)
Lessors shall not be liable for any dan1age
occasioned by failure to keep said premises in
repair and shall not be liable for any damage done,
caused or occasioned by or frorn plumbing, gas,
wat·er, steam or other pipes, or the bursting, leaking or running of any washstand, tank, water
closet or waste pipe, in, upon or about said building or prmnises, nor from any damage occasioned
by water arising from acts or neglect of neighboring tenants.

(12)
If Lessees shall abandon or vacate said premises, the same shall be re-let by the Lessors for
such rent and upon such terms as Lessors shall
see fit, and if a sufficient sum shall not be thus
realized, after paying the expenses of such reletting and collecting to satisfy the rent hereby reserved, the Lessees agree to pay and satisfy all
deficiency.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(13)

Le8sees agree that if the ,estate rreated hereby shall be taken upon exerntion or any other
proress of law, or if the Lessees shall be declared
bankrupt or insolvent, or any receiver be appointed for the business and property of the Lessees and be not discharged within 60 days, or if
any assignn1ent shall be made of the Lessees'
property for the "benefit of c-reditors, or if Lessees
shall apply for reorganization or any extension
agree1nent with their creditors under any federal
or state law now in force or hereafter enacted,
then and in that event Lessors shall have the option of terminating this lease, or in their discretion, or exercising any and all other remedies to
which they may be entitled as a matter of law.

(14)
It is agreed that the rent and charges above
reserved shall be a first lien on the furniture, fixtures and personal property of the Lessees, and
that said property shall not be removed from said
pre1nises until the rent and other charges are
fully paid.

(15)
~ o waiver of any breach of any covenant,
condition or stipulation herein contained shall be
taken to be a waiver of any succeeding breach
thereof, and the acceptance of rent during any
period in which the Lessees may be in default
shall not be deemed to be a waiver of such default.

(16)
The Lessors covenant and agree that the Lessees upon paying the rental herein provided and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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performing all of the covenants and agreements
herein contained, shall and Inay in accordance
herewith peacefully and quietly have, hold and
enjoy said demised premises during the term hereof.
(17)
If Lessors .commence and successfully prosecute any action against the Lessees to protect or
enforce any of Lessors' right hereunder, or if
Lessors defend successfully in any action or proceeding by the Lessees against the Lessors, the
Lessees will pay to Lessors a reasonable attorney's fee in each such action, and Lessees shall
likewise receive a reasonable attorney's fee if
they are successful in each such action.
(18)

In the event that the demised premises shall
be destroyed by fir,e or the elements before or
after the commencement of the term herein specified, this lease shall wholly cease and terminate.
In the event that said premises are rendered untenable by fire or the ,elements, Lessors agree to
repair and restore said premises with reasonable
dispatch. In case of such repairs the rent due
hereunder shall abate during the making of the
same.
(19)
That the Lessees, their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, shall have the right and
option to lease said premises for a further term
of ten years, cmnmencing June 1st, 1956, on the
same terms and conditions as apply to the period
of the present lease, commencing June 7th, 1946,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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except for rental and exeept that during "aid extended period Lessees shall not be obligated to
make permanent inlproveinents provided in paragraph 3 hereof. Said right and option to re-lease
shall be exereised by the Lessees by serving written notice upon the Lessors, their heirs, executors,
ad1ninistrators or assigns, at least six Inonths
prior to ~Iay 31st, 1936, whieh notice shall be to
the effeet that said Lessees do then exercise said
option. If ~meh written notice is not served by the
Lessees upon the Lessors within the tiine and in
the manner stated, then said option shall expire.
If said notice is served within the time and in the
Inanner in this paragraph stated, the rental for
the extended term shall then be fixed by agreement between the parties at a minimum of Six
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per nwnth, and
at a maximum of Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars
($850.00) per month, said determination to be
made in accordance 'vith the then going rate of
rental and business conditions as they then exist.
If and after said option is exercised by the Lessees, and if the parties eannot 'then agree on a
rental between said minimum and maximum, then
each shall appoint an arbitrator and the two so
appointed shall choose a third and a 1najority of
the three shall fix the monthly rental to be paid
by the Lessees to the Lessors between the miniInurn and maximum herein stated, and their decision shall be binding· upon the parties hereto.
(20)

No remedy herein conferred upon the Lessors shall be considered exclusive of any other
remedy, but the same shall be cumulative and
shall be in addition to every other remedy given
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hereunder, or now or hereafter existing at law or
in equity or by statute.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Lessors
and Lessees have hereunto executed this agreement the day and year first hereinabove written.
Signed by the parties)

(1

From the tenns of the lease it will be noted that
the defendants leased to the plaintiffs the building at
248-256 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, ·which
is now known as "Wolfe's Sportsman's Headquarters."
1

While the lease is dated February 19, 1945, the plaintiffs by the provisions of paragraph 5 were not, upon
the occurrence of certain contingencies which did occur,
to hav·e any rights of possession or any obligations under
the lease until June 7, 1946, some 15 n1onths later than
its date. On the date of the lease the ~premises were occupied by the St;ewart Novelty Company under a lease
ending J nne 6, 1946, and if the Stewart Novelty Company paid their lease rental, then the plaintiffs here were
not to have any rights of possession or obligations under
their lease until June 7, 1946. The Stewart Novelty Company paid its rent, and so plaintiffs did not become entitled to the possession of the leased premises and had
no obligations under the lease until June 7, 1946, and
• of ten years ending May 31st, 1956; desigthen for a term
nated in the lease as the last ten years. It is important
to bear these facts in mind. For the 15 months covered
by the lease preceding June 7, 1946, the plaintiffs had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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neither rig-ht:' nor obligations, but defendants tlid have
obligati(m~.

In paragraph 6 of the lease the plaintiffs '"agree to
and do hereby accept said pren1ises in the condition and
state of repair they are now in," but under paragraph
S the defendants ·who drew the lease Inade the following
covenant: ••For the entire tenn of this lease the Lessors
~hall have the obligation to keep the roof of the leased
prmnises in good condition. and repair." In other words,
the plaintiffs only conditionally accepted the premises
in the condition and state of repair they were in on Feb.ruary 19, 19±5; that acceptance was modified, conditioned
and lin1ited by the express agreement of the defendants
that plaintiffs had no responsibility for the roof and
that defendants alone assumed that responsibility for
the entire term of the lease. The plaintiffs accepted the
pre1nises 15 n1onths before they ever went into possession only provided the defendants for that 15 1nonths
period and for the entire remaining term should keep the
roof in good condition and repair.
In paragraph 6 the plaintiffs agreed that after
they took possession or for the last 10 years of the lease
they would make all improvements, upkeep and repairs,
only ''except as hereinafter stated,'' the exception being
the roof as specified in paragraph 8. The plaintiffs even
for the last 10

~-ears

of the lease, the period ·of their

actual tenancy, had no obligations, ordinary or extraordinary, with respect to the roof. The defendants assumed and undertook the entire responsibility for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1&
roof both for the last 10 years and also for the earlier
15 months period when the plaintiffs had no rights or
obligations under the lease or with reference to the
premises. Under the lease the plaintiffs never had any
obligation with reference to the roof and they accepted
the premises only upon and subject to the aforesaid
express liability of defendants for the roof. This further
is made clear by the provisions of paragraph 3 wherein
it is stipulated that for the last 10 years the rental of
$600.00 per month has been agreed upon if the plaintiffs
will .make certain pennanent improvements including
the installation of a first.-class front which improvements shall cost not less than $10,000.00. These improveInents were to be commenced on or before June 7, 1946,
(the beginning of plaintiffs' occupancy), and after they
were completed the lease expressly forbade the plaintiffs from making any further structural changes on the
premises without the consent of the defendants. Not only
did the lease require the defendants to keep the roof in
good condition for the entire term but it forbade the
plaintiffs from making structural changes of any kind
after the initial permanent improvements had been completed.
The plaintiffs in October of 1945, (R. 37), after the
lease was signed but before they were entitled to possession conferred with defendant James L. White about the
condition of the roof and Mr. White assured the plaintiff, Hubert Wolfe, that the roof had been put in good
condition and that it was in excellent shape. The plaintiffs in preparatio~ for their occupancy and to fulfill
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the tenus of the lease to n1ake pennanent in1provements
in the ~tore front employed .JLr. A. B. Paulson, a cOinpetent and qualified arehitect, (R. 3) who in turn applied to :Jir. Tipton, Superintendent of the Bureau of
:Mechanical Inspection of Salt Lake City, for a pennit
to rmnodel the front of the leased property. l\lr. rripton,
Exhibit "B,' · ( R. 17), refused to grant the penni t because the roof of the building was unsafe . .J[r. Tipton
stated that he had notified :Jlr. James L. \Vhite of this
condition as early as January 22, 1946. Under date of
April 29, 19-!6, ~Ir. Tipton also wrote to plaip.tiff, Hubert
\Volfe, informing him that continued occupancy of the
building would not be permitted until the unsafe conditions with reference to the roof were remedied. Exhibit "C.'' (R. 18)
The plaintiffs conferred with the defendants who
refused to do anything with reference to the roof. Therefore, instead of the plaintiffs being able to take possession and occupy the premises on June 7, 1946, they were
denied occupancy until the _roof was fixed, and they were
forced, because of the refusal of the defendants to do
so, to correct the defective conditions in the roof to
meet the requiren1ents of the public officials and the
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. Even after plaintiffs had
commenced work on ·the roof the work was further delayed at the request of the defendant, James L. White,
who asked the plaintiffs to suspend work so that he could
have his own inspection made, and plaintiffs again told
defendant White that it was satisfactory with them for
him to make the roof safe in any manner that was acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ceptable to the city and at as little expense as it was possible for him to incur. (R. 33) This last delay at the
request of the defendant White delayed the work until
July 31, 1946, so that by reason of all of the circumstances instead of the plaintiffs being able to occupy the
premis-es on June 7, 1946, actually they were not able
to go into occupancy of their leased premises until November 9, 1946. (R. 19)
The plain~iffs in order to occupy their leas·ed property at all were compelled to fix the roof themselves and
bring this action against the defendants for defendants'
refusal to comply with the terms of the lease.
The complaint was supplen1ented by a bill of particulars and amended by adding an additional paragraph,

.

'

paragraph VIII. \Ye shall now set forth the complaint,
the amendments as a part of it, followed by the exhibits
and bill of particulars, omitting all formal parts: (We
have already set forth in full the lease which is Exhibit
"A" of the complaint and shall not repeat that document
here).
(R. 1) Plaintiffs complain of defendants and allege:

I.
That all of the parties hereto are now and at
all times herein mentioned were residents of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, and that the property involved herein and hereinafter described is
situated in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
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II.
That on or about February 19, l~).f;}, at Salt
Lake City, Utah, the defendant Sarah White as
owner of the pre1nises and the defendant James L.
''l1ite, her husband, as lessors, leased by written
lease. to the plaintiffs, Hubert Wolfe, Shirley
'yolfe. his wife, Elliott Wolfe, Kayla Wolfe and
~Ien·ill Strong, copartners; doing business in Salt
Lake City, Utah, under the firm name and style
of 'Yolfe's Department Store and.to Wolfe's Departnlent Store, a co-partnership, as lessees, copy
of which lease is hereby referred to, attached
hereto as Exhibit ''A'' and hereby made a part
hereof, for a term commencing on March 7, 1945
and ending on ~lay 31, 1956, the following described premises located in Salt Lake City, Utah,
to-wit:
The one-story building, basement and
balcony, commonly designated as 248-256
South State Street, having dimensions of approximately 78 feet 3 inches on State Street,
by 123 feet 6 inches in depth.

III.
That said lease provided by paragraph three
thereof that on or before June 7, 1946, lessees,
plaintiffs herein, should commence at their own
expense certain permanent improvements to the
leased premises, including the installation of a
first class front, which improvements were to cost
not less than $10,000.00 exclusive of trade fixtures
or any other removable fixtures; and said lease
provided further by the terms of paragraph six
that the lessees, plaintiffs herein, aceepted the
premises in the condition and state of repair they
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were in on the date of said lease to wit: on or
about February 19, 1945, and that:
''For the last 10 years of this lease, all
improvements, upkeep and repairs, of every
kind and nature whatsoever, regardless of
the extent thereof and whether the same be
ordinary or extraordinary, and regardless of
how the same may be necessitated, except
as :P.ereinafter stated, including repair and
upkeep of the heating plant and replacement
of all glass, including plate glass broken, are
to be made at the expense of the Lessees.''
and that said lease further provided by paragraph
eight that
"For the entire term of this lease the
Lessors shall have the obligation to keep the
roof of the leased premises in good condition
and repair; to pay general taxes and lighting
assessments levied against said property, all
fire insurance premiums and premiums on
any other insurance the owner elects to
carry.''
and said lease provided further by the terms of
paragraph seventeen
''If Lessors commence and successfully
prosecute any action against the Lessees to
protect or enforce any of Lessors' rights hereunder, or if Lessors defend successfully in
any action or proceeding by the Lessees
against the Lessors, the Lessees will pay to
Lessors a reasbnable attorney's fee in each
such action, and Lessees shall likewise receive a reasonable attorney's fees if they are
successful in each such action.''
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IY.
That preparatory to and for the purpose of
Inaking the pennanent improvem,ents required by
the tern1s of said lease .as aforesaid, plaintiffs enlployed a con1petent and qualified architect, one
~\. B. Paulson of Salt Lake City, Utah, and the
said ...\. B. Paulson on behalf of the plaintiffs applied to the proper officials of Salt Lake City
Corporation. to wit: the Superintendent of the
Bureau of :Jiechanical Inspection, for a permit to
make said improvements and to remodel the front
of said leased property and that under date of
~larch 21, 1946, said A. B. Paulson received a
letter from the said Superintendent of the Bureau
of ~Iechanical Inspection, Salt Lake 'City Corporation, advising that the said application for
pennit was being held in abeyance because of the
unsafe condition of the roof of said leased premises, copy of which letter is hereby referred to,
attached hereto, marked Exhibit '' B'' and by
this reference made a part hereof, and that under
date of April 29, 1946, the plaintiff Hubert Wolfe
received a further letter from said Superintendent
of Bureau of Mechanical Inspection, Salt Lake
City Corporation, refusing to allow the said
leased premises to be occupied ·at all until the
roof thereof was made safe, copy of which said
letter is hereby referred to, attached hereto,
marked Exhibit '' C '' and by this reference made
a part hereof.
1

v.
That h~~ bill No. 51, 1940, the Board of City
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, adopted
the "Building Code" of 1940 and that said code
and ordinance was in full force and effect in Salt
Lake City at all times herein mentioned; that by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

the terms and provisions of Section 201 of said
Code it was provided that no person shall add to,
enlarge, alter, repair or change any building or
structure or cause the same to he done without
first obtaining a building permit therefor from
the Building Inspector of Salt Lake City, Utah;
that by the terms and provisions of Section 301 to
and including Section 305 of said Building Code
the Office of Building Inspector was created and
the Building Inspector authorized and directed
to enforce the provisions of the Code, with all the
powers, of a police officer and with power and
authority to enter any building or premises for
purpose of inspection and to prevent violation
of the Code, and that said sections also provide
that any building or portion thereof found to be
dangerous or unsafe or which violate the provisions of the said Code due to deterioration or
other defects may be condemned by the Building
Inspector, and that the Building Inspector shall
serve notice on the owner in writing or to the
person in charge of any building or premises setting forth wh::~,t must be done to make such building safe, and that the person receiving such notice
shall commence within forty-eight hours thereafter to make the necessary changes, repairs, or
alterations and proceed diligently with such work
and that no building shall he occupied or used
for any purpose after the Building Inspector
serves written notice of its unsafe or dangerous
condition until the instructions of the Building
Inspector have been complied with; that said
Building Code contained the terms and provisions
respecting roof construction and roof loads of
buildings in said city and that all of said ordinances contain other and further relevant provisions applicable to the leased premises herein,
and all' of said ordinances are hereby referred to
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and by this reference n1ade a part hereof the smne
as if they were pleaded haec verba herein; and
that by Bill No. 11 the City Cmnn1issioners of Salt
Lake City, Utah adopted an Ordinance effective
February 21, 19-!G, creating the Office of Superintendent of the Bureau of :\[echanical Inspection
and pro,iding that such 'Superintendent shall have
charge of the Bureau of :Jiechanical Inspection
and exercise all the powers required of and conferred on the Building Inspector by the Uniform
Building Code 1940 Edition of the Ordinances.
of Salt Lake Cit~~. which said Ordiances Bill No.
11 is hereby referred to and by reference made a
part hereof in all its terms and provisions the
same as if it were set forth haec verba herein.

YI.
That it appears from said Exhibit "B" that
the defendant James L. White was notified of the
unsafe condition of the said roof by the Superintendent of the Bureau of l\iechanical Inspection,
Salt Lake City Corporation, January 22, 1946; and
plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Hubert Wolfe on
several occasions prior to June 7, 1946, and
particularly in ~larch and April of said year, noti~
fied and called to the attention of the defendant
James L. White, the unsafe condition ot said roof
and the requirements and letters of the said public
official of Salt Lake City Corporation, to wit:
the Superintendent of said Bureau of Mechanical
InspeGtion, and at the same times notified and
called to the attention of the said James L. White
to the fact that the plaintiffs were excluded fron1
possessing said premises for the aforesaid
reasons, and requested the lessors, defendants
herein, to put the roof of said leased premises in a
safe and proper condition and also so as to meet
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the requirements of the said official of Salt Lake
City Co'rporation, and so as to provide proper
drainage facilities for said roof, and at the same
time notified and advised the defendants that if
proper action on their part was not taken to
remedy the said conditions plaintiffs would them.selves cause the roof to be made safe and in good
condition and repair and seek to hold the defendants liable for the costs of the same and for their
attorneys' fees thereupon incurred; that the defendants and each of them failed, neglected and
refused to take any action towards complying
with the requir·ements of the said Superintendent
of the Bureau of M,echanical Inspection, the Building Code or Ordinances of Salt Lake City Corporation or towards placing said roof in good
condition .or repair or to make said roof safe or
to provide drainage for said roof.
1

VII.
That because of the failur·e, neglect and refusal of the defendants or either of them to comply with the said requirements of said Superintendent of the Bureau of M·echanical Inspection,
Salt Lake City Corporation, the Building Code
or Ordinances- of Salt Lake City Corporation or
to ~eep said roof of· the leased premises in good
condition and repair, and in order to occupy the
leased pr.emises at all and to make them tenantable, plaintiffs were compelled to and did comply
with said requirements &foresaid and did place the
said roof in good condition and repair and repaired the same to make it safe and in good condition and also so as to provide proper drainage;
that in complying With said requirements aforesaid in putting said roof of the leased premises in
good condition and repair and in making the
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leased pre1nises tenantable, when they were not
otherwise tenantable, the plaintiffs were cmnpelled to and did expend in excess of $12,000.00,
which was a reasonable sum therefor, and in addition were dmnaged and sustained financial loss
hy reason of the defendants' aforesaid. refusal,
failure and neglect in exeess of the sun1 of $8,000;
to wit: in the total sun1 of $20,121.58, all of which
said expenditures are set forth in detail by Exhibit '' D,'' hereby referred to, attached hereto
and by this referenee made a part hereof, and in
addition bv reason of defendants' aforesaid refusal, fail~ue and neglect plaintiffs were compelled to and did en1ploy attorneys to prosecute
this action and have become obligated to pay
said attorneys reasonable attorneys' fees, which
plaintiffs on information ~nd belief·allege will be
in excess of $1,000.00, and that by reason of all
of the aforesaid plaintiffs have been damaged by
the acts and conduct of the defendants as aforesaid in the sum of $21,121.58 and that the defendants are indebted to the plaintiffs in said amounts
for their aforesaid violations of the terms of said
lease and by their acts and conduct as aforesaid,
and that no part of said sum has be·en paid to the
plaintiffs or any of them.
(First Amendment) (R. 36)

VIII.
That defendant, James L. White, drew the
lease and expressly advised plaintiffs before they
sign·ed the same that by accepting the premises in
the condition and state of repair they were then in
they did not accept the roof which was pro.vided
for in paragraph 8 of the lease and was defendants' responsibility; that the plaintiffs accepted
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the said leased premises in the condition and state
of repair they were in on the date of the lease, towit: on or about F·ebruary 19, 1945, only because
the defendants agreed that for the entire term of
the lease they would keep the roof in good condition and repair; that it was the agreement and
understanding of the parties to the lease that
for the entire term of the lease the defendants
were to be solely responsible for the roof of the
leased premises and would keep the same in goorl
condition at all times regardless of its condition
at the date of the lease, and that the plaintiff~
had no responsibility whatsoever for the roof or
for its safety, upkeep, maintenance, repair, or
condition regardless of the condition that the
same was in at the time the lease was entered
into, and it was the intention of the parties that
the lease express such understanding, and the
lease was drawn and prepared by defendant.
James L. White, and executed by the parties in
the belief that it does so state; that the plaintiffs
in accepting the premises in the condition and
state of repair they were then in expressly excluded the roof, and the defendants expressly
agreed that the roof was their responsibility and
not the responsibility of plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs did not inspect the roof prior to or at the
time of the execution of said lease and knew nothing about the condition of the roof, all of which
was known to the defendants, and the lease wa~
entered into with the knowledge on the part of
both parties that the plaintiffs knew nothing concerning the condition of the roof; that in accepting
the premises the plaintiffs did not accept an unsafe, defective, or ·unstable roof or a roof that
" was not in good condition and repair; that after
the execution of said lease and on or about October, 1945, and before the plaintiffs attempted
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to take physical possession of said prmnises the
defendant, James L. "\Yhite, assured the plaintiff,
Hubert "\Volfe, that he had put the roof in good
condition and that it was then in excellent shape;
that the said roof was not then in excellent shape;
that after the said lease was entered into the roof
conunenced to sag, and plaintiff, Hubert Wolfe,
called the san1e to the attention of the defendant,
J mnes L. \Vhite, which sagging gradually become
worse, but the defendants failed, refused, and
neglected to do anything to correct this condition
or to place the roof in good condition and repair
or to correct the unsafe condition thereof; that
the defendants at all times failed, neglected, and
refused to keep the roof of said leased premises in
good condition and repair; that in January, 1946,
the plaintiffs first learned that the roof was actually dangerous and unsafe, and that the plaintiffs then and there called the· same to the attention of the defendants who refused to put the roof
in good condition and repair; that the said roof
was unsafe and was not in good condition and
repair at that time in January, 1946, and became
progressively worse so that when the plaintiffs
were to take physical possession of the property
June 7, 1946, the said roof had become so unsafe
as to be dangerous to the life and limb of the
plaintiffs, their patrons, customers, and any persons entering upon said leased premises; that the
sagging of the roof became progressively
worse and the roof was dangerous and unsafe
because of the matters and things heretofore set
forth in the complaint and exhibits herein and because the trussed rafters which form the roof
framing were greatly undersized for the load they
were carrying, the water from snow and rain
would not drain off of the roof and would back up
and drain into the store and basement and add to
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the weight of the roof, the weight of the roof itself was too great for its supports, and on or about·
June 7, 1946, by reason of said conditions the roof
had become dangerous and unsafe as aforesaid;
that the defendants failed, neglected, and refused
to keep the roof of the leased premises in good
condition and repair, and the same was not in
good condition and repair so that on or about
June 7, 1946, by reason thereof there was great,
grave, and imminent danger on said date of the
roof collapsing and injuring persons in, upon,
and about the leased premises, and that such condition rendered the premises untenantable so that
the plaintiffs could not occupy the same in safety
or at all, and that on said date it was impossible
to correct the unsafe and dangerous condition of
the roof without the work, labor, and expenditures
thereafter done and expended for that purpose
as heretofore alleged by the plaintiffs in their
complaint herein; that plaintiffs do not know
when the said roof first became dangerous and
unsafe but said unsafe condition became progressively worse from the date of said lease and at
the time, to-wit: June 7, 1946, when plaintiffs
were to take physical possession had become so
bad as to render the said premises untenantable,
as aforesaid; that the plaintiffs frequently requested the defendants to put the roof in good
condition and repair, but that the defendants and
each of them failed, refused, and neglected to put
the roof in good condition and repair, and the
plaintiffs were compelled to put the roof in good
condition and repair at their own expense as hereinbefore in their complaint alleged; that because
and as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' failure, refusal, and neglect, as afDresaid, the plaintiffs sustained the damages and exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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penses hereinbefore alleged and as set forth in
the~r con1plaint, .B~xhibits, and Bill of Particulars
in the sun1 of $21,121.58, and were c01npelled to
and did employ attornp~·s as heretofore alleged.
('Sec-ond an1endment) (R. 51)
That the defendant J mnes L. White is now
and at all ti1nes herein n1entioned was a member of
the Utah State Bar and a practicing lawyer in
Salt Lake City, Utah; that he drew the lease between the plaintiffs and defendants and in all
n1atters and things pertaining thereto he represented and acted for both defendants, and that in
the discussion pertaining to the lease and the advisability of having another attorney look over the
lease prior to the signing of the same by the
plaintiffs, the plaintiff Hubert Wolfe asked the
defendant James L. White if there was anything
in the lease that should be clarified by another
attorney, and the defendant James L. 'Vhite advised the said plaintiff that there was no such
necessity and that the lease w·as in the usual for1n
with the exception that the plaintiffs were responsible for everything in connection with the
building except the roof which the defendant
James L. White told the plaintiff was the responsibility of the defendants under the terms of
the lease; that the said plaintiff then and there
specifically called the attention of the said defendant to the provision of Paragraph 6 to the
' effect that "The lessees agree' to and do hereby
accept said premises in the condition and state
of repair they are now in,'' and asked the said
defendant if said provision should not be modified
to read, "with the exception of the roof," so as
to express the aforesaid understanding of the
parties, and the said defendant then and there
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be neeessary as it would only be· a repetition of
what was provided for in Paragraph 8, which said
Paragraph 8 the defendant advised the plaintiff
expressed such aforesaid understanding and provided that the sole responsibility for the roof for
the entire term of the lease was the defendants'
responsibility and was not under the terms of the
lease the responsibility of the pla~ntiffs; that the
said defendant James L. White specifically represented to the said plaintiff that the language of
the lease with reference to the acceptance of the
premises in the condition and state of repair they
wer·e then in did not include the roof and that the
plaintiffs had no responsibility whatsoever for
anything pertaining· to the roof; that the said
plaintiff then advised the said defendant that
the plaintiffs would sign the lease if the roof was
the sole responsibility of the defendants and if the
language that the plaintiffs accepted the premises
in the condition they were then in did not include
the roof; that the said repres·entations of the said
defendant, as aforesaid, were made as an inducement to the plaintiffs to sign the lease; that the
said defendant James L. White then and there
advised the said plaintiff that he, the said James
L. White, had drawn the lease to incorporate
therein the aforesaid understanaing of the parties,
and that the lease did express the aforesaid understanding in all respects, and that the language of
the lease as to accepting the premises in the condition and state of repair they were then in did not
cover, refer to or include the roof; that the said
James L. White knew and now knows that the
plaintiffs signed the said lease because of said
representations and in reliance thereon, and that
the plaintiffs did sign said lease because of said
representations and in r·eliance thereon, and that
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the said defendants are now estopped to assert
any other or different interpretation of the said
lease. and that. the said lease and the language
thereof to the effect that the plaintiffs accepted
the pre1nises in the condition and state of repair
they were then in should be interpreted to exclude
the roof and all parts thereof frmn such acceptance on the part of the plaintiffs.
\YHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judg1nent
against the defendants, jointly and severally, in
the sum of $21,121.58 and for such further reasop.able attorneys' fees as plaintiffs may incur herein
and for their costs here incurred.
Exhibit "B"

(R. 17)

(Copy of Letter sent to A. B. Paulson
from

~Ir.

\V1n. Y. Tipton.)
~larch

21, 1946

:Jir. A. B. Paulson
Continental Bank
City
Dear Sir:
Concerning your application, dated 1Iarch
20, 1946 for a permit to remodel the front of the
property at 250 South State Street:
It has come to my attention that the rafters
which form the roof framing have been overstressed and are sagging under the load they
carry, also the girders between columns at the
rear of the store are undersized and bowed.
Mr. Jam·es L. White, the owner, was notified
of this condition January 22, 1946.
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Obviously if the store is to be under continued
occupancy this condition must be remedied and
therefore your application is being held in abeyance until assurance is given that the roof condition will be taken care of.
A plan showing your proposal will. be expected.
Sincerely,
Signed: Wm. Y. Tipton
Supt. BJ\f.I.
Exhibit "C"

(R. 18)

Salt Lake City Corporation
Bureau of
Mechanical Inspection
400 City & County Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
April 29, 1946
l\fr. H. Wolfe
224 :South State
City
Dear Sir:
In regard to your future occupancy of the
property at 250 South State Street;
l\farch 20, 1946, l\fr. A. B. Paulson, Architect,
made application· for a permit to remodel the
front of this property, which application was held
in abeyance until assurance was given that the
roof would be structurally altered to make it safe.
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It was called to the attention of ~I r. Paulson
and also ~Ir. 'Vhite, the owner, that this condition
prevailed.
I a1n now calling it to your attention as lessee.
Recently ~Ir. Hargreaves, the City's Chief
Building Inspector, made an inspection of the
roof truss system for the main fore-part of the
store and he found that the trussess were not
adequate both as to design and as to erection.
Also that the main ceiling beams both for the
front and rear part of the store ar·e sagged and
are evidently too light to carry the roof load. Also
that the roof drainage system has proved to be
inadequate.
These factors make it mandatory upon me to
refuse to allow continued occupancy of this structure beyond this summer season for fear of future
heavy snow loading which might cause total beam
and truss failure and consequent collapse of the
roof structure.
Sincerely,
/s/ Wm. Y. Tipton
Exhibit "D"

(R.

1~)

WOLFE'S
Salt Lake City, Utah
ROOF

ActU;al Damages
Roof actual cost ------------------------------------------$13,679.56
Plus Architects Fees 6% -----------------820.77

$14,400.33
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Less estimate to
eliminate ·Posts --·-----$2,099.00
Plus 6% A. F.____________ 125.94
$2,224.94
2,224.94
$12,175.39
Overtime paid on Bldg. to rush construction because of delay & to get
moved some time before Christmas

1,293.86

(See letter Cannon)
3 Months Rental to J. White---------·····-----Delayed occupancy (3 Mths.) on
account of roof. Could and would have
been moved by August 1st according -to
plan. Fixtures & mdse. purchas·ed to coincide with this date.
4 Months rent old store $375.00 per
month, minimum rental ---------------·----··

1,800.00

1,500.00

Could have leased bldg. to Jack & ·
Jill Shop if I could have vacated on
schedule. $375.00 per month for every
month vacant.
Excess percentage rental paid on old
store lease from August 1st to November 9th, date we moved to new
store --------------------------------------·---------······
2¥2% from total sales
$199,211.99 to$ 200,000
$19.70
19.70
2% from total $200,000
to $362,131.50 3,362.63

3,282.33

$3,282.33
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George Kelson (Investigation of Roof
structure ---------------------------------------------Heath & Burbidge (Survey to ·establish
corner for proof rafters ------------------

45.00
25.00

~-\.CTlT AL D~-\.:JIAG ES

Plus

~-\.ttorney

------------------------------$20,121.58
fees & Court costs ____ 1,000.00

TOTAL ----------------------------------------$21,121.58
BILL OF PARTICULARS (R. 30)
Plaintiffs supplementing their allegations of
paragraph YII of their complaint herein and as an
addition thereto and as a more detailed explanation of Exhibit "D" of their said complaint, file
this as a bill of particulars for said purpose and
show:
1. Plaintiffs prior to undertaking any work
with reference to the roof of the leased premises
consulted with the building inspector of Salt Lake
City, A. B. Paulson, Slack Winburn and George
Nelson, architects and structural engineers, to
determine the quickest and cheapest way of eonforming to the building inspector's demand to
make said roof safe; that plaintiffs advised defendant James L. White of all of their findings
and many times prior to June 7, 1946 asked him to
make the roof safe and the said defendants always
refused so to do~ that plaintiffs thereupon engaged the Cannon Construction Compa~y, competent building contractor, to undertake work on
said roof, and it was the opinion of all of the
aforesaid that the best, quickest and most economical method of making the said roof safe was to
tear down the entire roof and salvage all of the
lumber and material that it was possible to salvage and re-use all that could be re-used. This
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.was done and all the lumber and materials capable of being used were uHed at a great saving
of material; that steel beam construction was
used because it was easier to obtain steel due to
the lumber shortage which prevailed at said time
and because the use of steel was as cheap or
cheaper than lumber, and the only kind of lumber
obtainable at that time was so green as to render
it unsuitable for this type. of construction; that
60% or more ·of the old material in the roof was
used in the work of fixing the roof as aforesaid;
that since steel was us·ed it was unnecessary to
continue the use of eight center supporting posts
in the middle of the store room, and they were
eliminated and the added cost of $2,224.94 has
been deducted in Exhibit '' D'' from the cost of
fixing said roof. This extra cost was paid by the
plaintiffs and is not included in the complaint as
a charge against the defendants. The elimination
of the posts had nothing whatever to do with fix. ing the roof nor did they change the necessity for
fixing the roof as it was eventually const~ucted.
All of plaintiffs' fixtures were ordered and are
not set up in place as though the posts were still
present and the empty spaces where the posts
would have been are still present in the store. The
first item of actual damage in Exhibit "D" for
$12,175.39 is made up of the following:
1. The tearing out and r·emoving of the old roof

structure, salvaging all lumber possible for
reuse into the new structure.
2. Sanding that portion of the floor where damage had occurred due to rai:h and sun which
had occurred while the roof was off. Heavy
rains fell during the period the roof was off
and plaintiffs were unable by the exercise of
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any precautionary measures to prevent dan1age to the floor due to this cause.
3. Structural steel trusses and their erection.
(Note elin1ination of $2,224.94 above).

±. Framing and sheathing of new roof structure.
5. New roof covering.
6. Lathing and plastering of ceiling under this
portion of the h~ilding.
7. Electric wiring in this portion of the ceiling.
8. Installation of new roof drains. These drains
replaced existing roof drains and located them
properly so as to eliminate further damage
to the roof from inadequate drainage and
consequent further liability to the defendants
for damage to the roof.
9. niinor sheet metal work for flashings.
10. Taxes, insurance, and contractor's fee.

11. Reinforcing beams on roof in rear of building.
2. The item of $1,800.00 claimed in Exhibit
"D" is becaus·e of plaintiff's inability to occupy
the store at all for three months. Plaintiffs under
their lease could have been in the store by August
1, 1946, but by reason of defendants' failure to
fix the roof they were not able to move into their
leased premises until November 9, 1946. The
$1,800.00 was paid defendants by the plaintiffs
for the period August 1, 1946 to November 9,
1946 when they were denied all occupancy of the
premises due to the defendants' violation of the
lease and when plaintiffs would have been in ocSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cupancy had defendants complied with their obligations under the lease.
3. The two items of $1,500.00 and $3,282.33
set forth in Exhibit "D" were rent actually paid
by the plaintiffs for their old premises and which
they would not have had to pay had they been able
to move into their premises on August 1, 1946
as they could have done except for defendants'
dereliction as aforesaid. Plaintiffs had the old
premises rented to a sub-tenant who would have
taken them and paid the rent, but because of defendants' failure to keep the roof of the leased
premises in good condition, plaintiffs wer·e compelled to pay four months' rent on the old store
at $375.00 per month and a percentage of their
total sales as set forth in Exhibit '' D'' which they
would not have had to pay had they been able to
occupy the leased premises according to the terms
of the lease.

4. The other items of Exhibit '' D'' are self
explanatory.
5. As shown by Exhibits "B" and "C"
plaintiffs commenced their efforts to comply with
their provisions of the lease in ample time to have
had the building permit issued and the construction of the new front promptly under way and
all of plaintiffs' construction could have been completed and in actual occupancy by August 1, 1946
had defendants complied with their obligations
under the lease. Plaintiffs' fixtures were all ord·ered and delivered long prior to August 1 and
ready to be installed, and plaintiffs were compelled to store said fixtures and all fall merchandise in storerooms in Salt Lake City for none of
which damage plaintiffs are attempting to recover from defendants. Because of defendants'
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failure and refusal as aforesaid plaintiffs were
unable to get a building pern1it from the city
until June 21 when they immediately started to
work, but on or about July 5, 1946 defendant
Jmnes L. "\Yhite asked plaintiffs to suspend operations so that he could have his own inspection
n1ade and that plaintiffs thereupon told the defendant James L. "\Vhite that it was satisfactory
with them to make the roof safe in any manner
that was acceptable to the city and at as little expense as it was possible for them to incur; to take
his plans and subn1it them to the city building inspector, and that defendant James L. White again
refused to do anything, insisting that the responsibility was not his to undertake any of said
work. This last delay at the specific instance and
request of the defendant James L. White delayed
the work until July 31, 1946 and there was fully
three months delay in securing occupancy of the
premises due solely to the failure of the defendants to make the roof of said leased premises safe.
It is agreed that defendants demurrers and
motions to strike may be considered if defendants
so desire as applicable to this bill of particulars
in order that rulings may be made by this court
without additional delay.

ASSIGNl\iENT OF ERRORS
The trial court erred in sustaining defendants' general demurrers to plaintiffs' complaint and amendments
thereto and in dismissing the action.

ARGUMENT
The trial court stated orally that the general demurrers were sustained because of the provisions of
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paragraph 6 of the lease that ''the lessees agree to and do
hereby accept said premises in the condition and state of
repair they are now in.'' The trial court was apparently
of the opinion that this provision of the lease stands
alone and is controlling, in spite of many other provisions that limit and modify it and in spite of the allegations of the complaint showing the true meaning of the
acc-eptance.
The lease cannot be construed by refe~ence to the
foregoing provision alone, and to give it the construction
given it by the trial court results in ignoring other provisions of the lease equally positive which clearly indicate that the lessees'· acceptance of the prernises in the
condition and state of repair they were then in was only
because the lessors agreed to take the sole responsibility
for the roof. Properly construed we contend that the lease
reads : ''the lessees agree to and do here by accept said
premises in the condition and state of repair they are
now in, except for the roof, which is no obligation of
the lessees either for the period when they are out of
possession or for the last 10 years of the leas·e, but for
the entire term of the lease the roof is the sole obligation and responsibility of the lessors who shall have
the sole obligation and responsibility for the entire term
of keeping the roof of the leased premises in good condition and repair." When the plaintiffs were to go into
possession and occupancy on June 7, 1946, the roof was
not in good condition. The defendants had agreed that
for the entire term of the lease the roof would be in good
condition and that they would maintain it in good conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dition. They did not Inaintain it in good condition, it was
not in good condition, and defendants refused to put it
in good condition. In fart the defendants refused to do
anything at all 'dth reference to the roof.
It appears to us that a mere reading of the lease
and the allegations of the complaint demonstrates that
the defendants violated the terms of the lease and that
no citation of legal authorities should be necessary to
demonstrate that fact. However, as we read the cases
there is no authority whatever to sustain either the trial
court in its position or the argument advanced by the
defendants to the trial court. The defendants filed lengthy
briefs in which they persistently and repeatedly inaccurately set forth the lessors' obligations with reference to the roof. They cited nume.rous cases involving
only the word "repair" to the effect that keeping premises in "repair" meant only keeping the premises in the
state of repair they were in at· the time they were entered upon by the lessee. That, however, is not the situation or the question present here. More than repairs is
involved. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs never
inspected the roof, knew nothing about the condition of
it, had no concern with the roof because of the defendants' assertions and representations that plaintiffs had
no . responsibility for the roof and that they, defendants, would take care of it. The lease does not limit defendants duty merely to keeping the roof in repair. They
are also required for the entire term to keep it in good
condition. The lease says that the lessees obligations do
not include the. roof. The defendants expressly agreed
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that for the entire term of the lease they would keep the
roof not only in repair but in good condition. This obligation is unlimited and applies whether the work necessary
to keep it in good condition requires structural changes
or not. In fact no structural work except the original improvements including the store front could be done without consent of the lessors. The lessors refused to perform
their obligations. The public authorities refused to permit further occupancy of the premises until certain re- ·
quirements were met. It then became the duty and the
right of the plaintiffs under both the lease and the law
to meet those requirements and make the roof safe.

THE COMPLAINT BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER
THE AMENDMENTS STATED A CAUSE OF
ACTION
1.

The public authorities declared the roof unsafe and r·efused to permit qccupancy of the
premises until it was made safe, and that in
and of itself was sufficient to justify the
plaintiffs, upon defendants' refusal to do so,
in fixing the roof and recovering ther·efor
from the defendants.

2.

The roof was in fact not in good condition and
the plaintiffs had the right upon defendants'
refusal to put it in good condition to do so
thems·elves and hold the defendants liable.

We shall discuss these propositions in the order
named.
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DEFINITIONS
Paragraph S of the lease provides: '·For the entire
tenn of thi:3 lea:3e the lessors shall have the obligation
to keep the roof of the leased pren1ises in good condition
and repair. ''
"For the entire tenn of this lease" means from
February 1~l. Hl!5, to ~lay 31, H)56, and includes a
15 months period during which the plaintiffs had no
obligations under the lease and had no right to the
possession of the premises. For this period as well as
for the last 10 years of the lease the defendants agreed
''to keep the roof of the leased premises in good condi-_
tion and repair. ' '
"To keep" ,means to maintain and preserve from
risk or danger from the beginning to the ~nd, T·annen-

baum vs. Sea 001ast Tr. Company, 198 A. 855, &. Words
and Phrases, under ''to keep.''
"Roof" is defined by Webster's New International
Dictionary as ''the cover of any building, including the
roofing and all the materials and construction necessary
to carry and maintain the same upon the walls or other
uprights.'' The roof is not merely the exterior covering.
''Good condition'' implies changing conditions, City

of New Bern vs. Atlantic, 75 S.E., 807 (N.C.), and also
means reasonably safe condition; sufficient or satisfac-tory for its purposes, Missouri K. & T._R. Company vs.
Smith, 82 S. W., 788 (Tex.).
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The building inspector's letters, Exhibits '' B'' and
"C," (R. 17, 18), state that the rafters which form the
roof framing have been overstressed and are sagging;
that the girders are undersized and bowed and that the
trusses of the roof truss system were not adequate, and
that the ceiling beams both to the rear and front part
of the store are sagged and too light to carry the roof
load, also that the roof drainage system was inadequate.
''Rafters'' according to Webster are the sloping timbers of the roof, and ''girders'' are the beam supports.
The ''trusses of the roof truss system'' are the members
forming the frame work of the roof, bracing the roof
and the rafters. The ''ceiling beams'' are the horizontal
members supported at the ends to carry the roof load.
1. THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES DECLARED THE

ROOF UNSAFE AND REFUSED TO PERMIT
OCCUPANCY OF THE. PREMISES UNTIL IT
WAS MADE SAFE, AND THAT IN AND OF ITSELF WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
PLAINTIFFS, UPON DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL
TO DO SO, IN FIXING THE ROOF AND RECOVERING THEREFOR FROM THE DEFENDANTS.
The defendants drew this lease, (R. 36, 51), and had
the duty to express the intention of the parties that the
roof was the sole responsibility of the defendant.s for the
entire term of the lease. It is our conviction that the
lease does expressly so provide. The defendants drew
the lease and because of that fact and also because they
are the lessors the rule is well settled that any ambiguities will be construed against them and in favor of the
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lessees (plaintiffs), Teete.r rs. iliid- West Enterprise Co.,
52 Pac. (2), 810, (Okla.1935).
In the rase of Parr rs. rVas~atch Chcmioal Co., 105
Utah 272 on page 277. 143 Pac. (2) 281, this court said,
.. The language ·keep said premises tenantable' indicates
that the parties understood the warehouse would be made
tenantable.'' \Y e accepted the premises only with the
express understanding that for the entire term of the
lease all parties understood that the roof "would be
made'' in good condition by defendants. If it was not
in good condition at any time during the entire term of
the lease, defendants ·agreed to put it in good condition.
\Ye did not, as defendants contend, accept the· roof with
the limited obligation upon the part of the defendants
to keep it only in the condition in which it was on February 19, 1945. If the roof was not in good condition
at that time, then it was defendants' obligation to make
the roof in good condition and to maintain it in good ·
condition. As we have already pointed out, ''good condition" implies changing conditions and means reasonably safe and sufficient or satisfactory for its purposes.
Under the lease we were not to have possession for
15 months, and by the express terms of the lease, the
defendants agreed that the roof, when we did take possession, would be in good condition. They had agreed
that during the 15 months period they would keep it,
that is they would maintain it, in good condition. It was
not in good condition when we attempted to take possession, defendants refused either to make it in good
condition or to maintain it in good condition, and they
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did not at any time maintain it in good condition or make
it in good condition.
Under the language of the lease we had not right
prior to June 7, 1946, to do anything at all.with reference to the premises. Let us assume that prior to
June 7, 1946, but subsequent to February 19, 1945, the
city authorities of Salt Lake City had notified the defendants that the building must be vacated until the roof
was made safe. There can be no question under such a
situation that the defendants alone would have the obligation to ·comply with the requirements of the city
authorities. We were not required to do anything with
reference to improvements before June 7, 1946, and then
our obligation with reference to improvemen~s, upkeep
and repairs excludes the roof and is only for the last
10 years of the lease.
Having neither the right nor the obligation to do
anything with reference to the premises prior to June
7, 1946, it is clear that for that period we were under
no duty whatever to do anything with reference to the
roof or any other part of the premises, and had the
city authorities required the roof to be made safe during
that period it would have been absolutely no concern of
ours whatsoever. The roof actually was unsafe during
that period, so that when our right to possession came
on June 7, 1946, the roof was not in good condition. The
mere fact that the city authorities had not taken action
did not change the fact that the defendants had not kept
the roof in good condition. That we accepted the premSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1ses in that condition would be entirely i1n1naterial.
If the roof were unsafe, as it was, and we accepted the
preinises, that did not alter defendants' obligation to
make it safe and especially is this true by reason of the
fact that we had no obligation or right of possession
whatsoever for the- first 15 months. We accepted the
premises in the condition they were then in only upon
defendants' express agreement that the roof would be
made and kept safe for the entire term of the lease, and
particularly at the time we were to have the right of
occupancy. The arrival of our time for occup_ancy of
the premises did not lessen the defendants' responsibility
for the roof. If anything, it increased it. Defendants
liad agreed that we might go into possession on June 7,
1946, but because of defendants' refusal to make the
roof safe we were not able to occupy the leased premises
for the purposes for which we had leased them.
After occupancy even the work that we were required to do, which expressly excluded the roof, (Par.
6 & 8) was limited to improvements, upkeep and repairs.
1Ne were expressly forbidden by the provisions of paragraph 3 to make any structural changes without the
permission of the defendants. Neither before the time
of our occupancy nor after that period arrived did we
have any concern or obligation whatsoever with reference to the roof. This, it seems to us, appears clearly
from the express language of the lease. Even if it were
not clear ambiguities must be resolved in our favor and
against the defendants.
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Under paragraph 7 of the lease we agreed to occupy
the premises in a lawful manner. When we attempted
to occupy the premises we were confronted with the
letter from the Superintendent of the Bureau of Mechanical· Inspection of Salt Lake City, (Exhibit "C ", R.
18), wherein he said spea~ing of the unsafe condition
of the roof, "These factors make it mandatory upon
me to refuse to allow continued occupancy of the structure beyond this summer season for the fear of future
heavy snow loading which might cause total beam and
truss failure and consequent collapse of the roof structure." He had already advised our architect that he had
withheld issuance of the building permit for the remodeling of the front of the property because of the unsafe
condition of the. roof. (Exhibit "B", R. 17) .~rhus on
June 7, 1946, when defendants had agreed we might enter
into possession of the property we were refused a building permit and thus prevented from making the permanent improvements which we had agreed to make
because· of defendants dereliction, and we were also·
advised definitely that continued occupancy of the struchue would not be allowed. We could not get a building
permit, and we could not occupy the premises because
the roof was unsafe. We could not lawfully occupy
tpe premises unless and until the roof was made safe.
\Ve were under no duty or obligation to defy the public
authorities. In fact we were under the contractual obli~
gation not to do so. It would have been unlawful for us
to attempt to occupy the premises. The public authorities had said that the roof was not safe and that we
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could not occupy the preinises. "\Yhether it was safe or
unsafe it was not our right to dispute the public authorities. They said the roof was unsafe and that ended
the n1atter. The burden then was the defendants and
not ours to satisfy the public authorities either by con'incing then1 that they were wrong or by complying
''ith their requirements. The defendants refused to do
either. Clearly under the lease itself it was the defendants obligation if the roof ever became unsafe to make
it safe regardless of when it became unsafe. "Good
condition'' implies changing conditions and also means
reasonably safe condition; sufficient or satisfactory for
its purposes. EYerything the buildi:q.g inspector complained of was in the roof and an essential part of it.
Aceording to the public authorities the roof was not in ·
good condition. The defendants never at any time attempted by any proper proceedings to remove the ohjec. tions of the building inspector or to comply with his
requirements. The public authorities required the roof
to be made safe, and the defendants cannot in this proceeding question that action of those authorities. The
presumption in this case is that the public authorities
lawfully performed their duties and whether the defendants received oral or written notice is immaterial in the
face of the allegations of the complaint that the public
authorities notified the defendant, James L. White, as
early as January of 1946 of the unsafe condition, and
J

that we did the same thing ourselves frequently thereafter. 'Ve have pleaded the Ordinances of Salt Lake
City which show that the building inspector was within
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his right under those ordin~nces in refusing a permit to
us and in requiring the roof to be made safe. The courts
will not substitute their judgment for that of the municipal authorities in exercising their powers. ''The court
can do no more than to inquire whether an ordinance
or law is unreasonable, oppressive or discriminatory,
* * *",Kenyon Hotel vs. 0. S. L. R. CompaJny, 62 Utah
364, 375, 220 Pac. 382. The court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the public authorities even if it
- were so inclined. 8a~t Lake City vs. W estetrn Foundry
Co., 55 Utah 447, 187 Pac. 829. It was not our duty
to question the public authorities, and certainly we do
not believe this court will substitute its judgment for
that of the building inspector that the roof ·was unsafe.
Even if the lease had been silent as to the defendants' responsibility with reference to the roof,_ under
general law they still would have had the obligation to
comply with the requirements of the building inspector
to make the roof safe. Unless the lease itself requires
the tenant to do so the tenant is under no duty to make
changes, structural o~ otherwise, or alterations or improvements ordered by the pu-blic authorities. That is
the duty of the landlord. Even though the lease required
the tenant to make repairs, New York held in the case
of Hera.ld Sqwa~e RBalty Cornpany vs. Saks, 109 N.E.
545, (N.Y. 1915), that structural and permanent changes
required by the public authorities were the obligation
of the landlord. In that case the tenant had approved
the building plans, agreed to make repairs and to keep
the premises in good order and condition and to comply
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with the laws and ordinances of New York. Later New
York required certain show windows to be moved. TheNew York court held that this was an obligation of the
landlord in spite of the tenant's agreement and approval
of the plans as aforesaid. In the case of DeMoines Steel
Company rs. Ha.u:keye Amusement Company, 174 N.W.
703 (Ia. 1919), the tenant constructed fire escapes which
were required by the city ordinances. Even though these
fire escapes were on the landlord's property not covered
by the lease the court held it was the landlord's duty to
compl~- with the law and with the ordinance covering
the use of the property. (See also N·elson vs. Eicho ff~
158 Pac. 370, where the Oklahoma court held that where
premises become unsafe because of structural change~
the landlord must fix them or there is an eviction. In that
case the tenant agreed to make repairs.)
In the court below defendants cited numerous cases
which they contended are contrary to the foregoing rule,
but each and every one of the cases ~as clearly distinguishable upon its facts from the case at bar.
This court in the case of Heywood vs. Ogden Mo·tor
Company, 71 Utah 417, 266 Pac. 1040 (1928), answers
many of the arguments made by the defendants below
in the case at bar. In that case the lessor agreed to
make certain repairs on the premises and agreed that
the defendant might go into possession on December 1,
1924. The defendants were not able to go into possession on that date and as against the plaintiffs demand
for rent for September, October and November, 1925,
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nearly a year after defendants had gone into possession,
the -defendants claimed by way of setoff· that they were
kept from possession by the plaintiffs and asked for
damages on account of being deprived of the leased
premises for part of the month of December although
they had already paid the rEmt for -that month. They
also asked for damages for discontinuance of an elevator
by order of the public authorities. The trial court held
that because defendants accepted the keys to the pla~e
they were placed in possession. This court, however,
held that even though there was no express covenant
of quiet enjoyment (there is such a covenant here, (R.14)
such a covenant was implied and because the plaintiffs
had not done the work they were required to do, and by
reason thereof, defendants were excluded from possession, there was a breach of the implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment and that even though the defendants had
paid the rent they were permitted to set it off against
the plaintiffs' demand for rent for other months. This
court held that the plaintiffs by their failure to do what
they agreed to do on the premises had excluded the
defendants from them. This court also said that the
defendants should have been permitted to offer evidence
of damage because the public authorities refused to permit the use of the elevator in the building.
We had the right to make the roof safe and hold the
defendants for our damages upon their refusal to correct
the unsafe conditions. "It is well established that upon
the breach of a landlord of his covenant to repair, the.
tenant may make the repairs and recover the reasonable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

51
expenses therefor fron1 the landlord or charge it against
the rent.'' (Citing ntunerous cases) 32 Am. J ur p. 590,
Sec. 715. (See also Teeter vs. Mid-W.est Ent.erprise Cmnpany, 32 Pae. (2) 810, supra, holding that wher·e
the landlord fails to 1nake the repairs and they are substantial it is optional with the lessee to make the repairs
at the expense of the landlord). The tenant may recover
his actual damages to the extent that they are the natural,
direct and proximate result of a breach of the covenant
an(! such as may be reasonably supposed to be in contemplation of the parties at the tim~ of the execution
of the lease. 32 An1. J ur. p. 592.
It makes no difference whether or not the landlord
knew of the ordinance or knew that he was violating it.
In the court below the defendants contended that they
received no written notice from the city authorities to
make the roof safe. That does- not relieve the landlord
of responsibility. As pointed out by this court in the
case of W·ilcox vs. Jwmeson, 55 Utah 535, 188 Pac. 638,
where the landlord has the responsibility he is liable,
and his ignorance of the ordinance or failure of the city
to notify him is immaterial. In the case at bar the owner
had the obligation to make the roof safe both by lease
and by ordinance, and lack of knowledge or notice is
no defense for failure to comply with the requirements
of the ordinance. If the city authorities had permitted
us to occupy the premises after notifying us of the unsafe condition of the roof, we would have been civilly
liable along with the landlord for any injuries sustained
by persons upon our premises due to the unsafe con- .
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dition of the roof. In the case of Knight vs. F·oster
(N. c:) 79 S.E. 614, (a case cited by defendants in the
court below), the court expressly said that if the landlord knew that the premises were in vi~lation of law
by disrepair both he and the tenant would be liable
to a third person for any injuries due to the defective
premises, and particularly if the landlord contracts to
repair the very thing which is in disrepair. The court
also said that fixing the gate in that case was a change
and not a repair and that. the duty was upon the landlord to make it but liability was also upon the tenant
for injuries to third persons, that if the nuisance existed
at the time of the demise both the tenant and the landlord are liable. Under the holding of the Knight case
we could not safely occupy our leasehold without correcting the dangerous condition even had the city authorities
been willing for us to do so.
Defendants argued below that because the roof require~ structural changes they were under no obligation
to 1nake them because structural changes are not '' repairs.'' Such a contention is untenable and is directly
contrary to the express terms of the lease itself, which
does not confine defendants duty merely to ''repairs.''
Defendants so far have carefully refrained from stating
who was responsible for m8.king the roof safe. We could
not occupy the premises until it was made safe. Certainly there is nothing in the lease that places that burden upon us. Had the city required the roof to be made
safe prior to June 7, 1946, clearly the defendants alone
would have had the obligation, they having agreed to
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keep the roof in a good condition for the entire term
of the lease. The Inere fact that we became entitled to
possession on June 1, 19-1:6, did not change the defendants· responsibility nor did it impose upon us any duty
or obligation with reference to the roof. If it was not
in good condition at that tin1e, it was still the defendants' duty to put it in good condition. This they made
no effort to do,, and in order to get the benefit of our
leasehold we were required to perform defendants' duty
and seek redress in this action.
Because the city authorities said the roof was unsafe that fact alone required someone to make the roof
!3afe. At the time the building inspector declared the
roof to be unsafe we had neither the actual possession
nor the right to possession of the premises. We couldn't
have gone in and fixed the roof had we so desired. It
was still in this condition when our right to possession
under the lease accrued. Someone had the duty to fix
the roof. Nothing in the lease required us to do so, and
defendants had agreed that they would keep it in good
condition for the entire term of the lease, so regardless
of the condition of the roof at the time the lease was
entered into or regardless of what was required to make
the roof safe defendants had not kept it in good condition, and it was not in good condition when we had the
right to take over. So far as we were concerned when
the city authorities said the roof was unsafe that was
conclusive. If there had been no roof at all on the premises and \Ve had accepted the1n in the condition in which
they were then in, the defendants under the terms of
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this lease would have been required to have a roof in
good condition upon the property at the time we took
possession, June 7, 1946. By accepting the premises
in the condition they were in we did not cancel the
defendants' obligation assumed in the later provisions of
, the lease to see that there was a good roof on the premises when we became entitled to occupy them some 15
months later. As said by this court in the Farr vs.
Was1atch Chem.ical Oo. case, supra, the parties understood
that the roof would be made in good condition and this
good condition was to exist for the entire term of the
lease and particularly at the time when we were to take
over the occupancy of the premises. ''Good Condition''
implies changing conditions and means reasonably safe
condition; sufficient or satisfactory for its purposes.

2.

THE ROOF WAS IN FACT NOT IN GOOD CONDITION AND THE PLAINTIFF1S HAD THE
RIGHT UPON DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO
PUT IT IN GOOD CONDITION TO DO SO THE~f
SELVES AND HOLD THE DEFENDANTS
LIABLE.

The complaint originally was drawn upon the theory
that the decision of the city authorities that the roof
was unsafe was final and als:o that the roof in fact was
unsafe. When the court sustained the general demurrer
to this complaint, we amended by alleging other facts
which it had not up to that time seemed necessary to
allege. We then specifically alleged that the defendant,
James L. White, drew the lease and expressly advised
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1

us that in accepting the pren1ises in the condition and
state of repair they were then in we did not accept the
roof because under .para?raph 8 of the lease the roof
was defendants' responsibility. We also alleged that
plaintiffs accepted the premises only because the defendants agreed that theirs was the sole r.esponsibility for
the roof and that in accepting the premises the roof wa~
excluded from that acceptance. vVe also alleged that
the plaintiffs did not inspect the roof, knew nothing about
the condition of it, and that this was known to the defendants, and that the lease was entered into with the knowledge on the part of both parties that the plaintiffs knew
nothing concerning the condition of the roof; that in
accepting the premises the plaintiffs did not accept an
u~safe, defective or unstable roof; .that on or about
October 1945, the defendant, James L. White, assured
the plaintiff, Hubert Wolfe, that he had put the roof
in good condition and that it was in excellent shape.'
'\Ye alleged that the roof was not in excellent shape, and
after the lease was entered into the roof commenced to
sag and that the sagging became worse and this we
called to the attention of the defendants who refused
to correct the condition. We also alleged that the roof
was unsafe and not in good condition and repair in
January and became progressively worse, and that at
the time we were to take possession in June it had
become so unsafe as to be dangerous; that we do not
know when the roof first became dangerous but that it
did becon1e dangerous and became progressively worse
from the date of the lease until on June 7, 1946, the
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premises were untenantable because of the roof. We also
alleged that the defendant, James L. "\Vhite, is a n1em- ·
her of the Utah Bar, and that upon being asked if there
was anything in the lease that should be clarified the
defendant, James L. "\Vhite, advised the plaintiff, Hubert
Wolfe, that there was no such necessity, and that it
was unnecessary in paragraph 6 of the lease to put an
exception as to the roof after the provision that the
lessees accepted the premises, because that would only
be a repetition of that which was provided for by paragraph 8, and that the said defendant expressly stated
that paragraph 8 contained such an exception; that the
defendant, James L. White, told the said plaintiff that
the language with reference to the acceptance of the
premises did not include the roof, and that such representation was made as an inducement to the plaintiffs
to sign the lease, and that the plaintiffs signed the lease
in reliance upon such representations. We then alleged
that defendants are now estopped to assert any other
or different interpretations of the said lease. (See paragraph VIII of the complaint, R. 36, 51)
We still believe that the lease does exactly what
:Mr. White represented to the plaintiffs it was intended
to do. However, the trial court disregarded this interpretation of the lease and apparently in spite of defendants' general demurrers and the legal admissions consequent thereto, still felt that the language of paragraph
6 was controlling in spite of all the other modifying
provisions of the lease. The trial court singled out one
provision of the lease and gave no effect whatever to
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the other provisions which should be read in connection
with paragraph 6.
Be that as it n1ay, the complaint as amended does
definitely establish that the lease must be interpreted
as we have indicated it should be. Every one of the
defects pointed out by the building inspector were in the
roof itself. The roof was not in good condition. Defendants agreed to keep it in good condition, and they did
not do so. For our present purposes in view of the
general demurrer the foregoing facts are established.
That we are entitled to damages follows as a matter of
law under all the authorities. The special demurrers
and motions to strike were ove.rruled, and we can complain only of the sustaining of the general demurrers.
That it was error to sustain them we believe "is established.
The defendants also asserted below that because
of the provisions of paragraph 11 they were not liable
in, any event. That paragraph provides, "Lessors shall
not be liable for any damage occasioned by failure to
keep said premises in repair." We are not complaining
of defendants' failure to keep the premises in repair.
That paragraph did not exempt defendants from liability for failure to keep the roof in good condition, and
it is that failure of which we are here complaining.
In fact we interpret paragraph 11 to mean that defendants' will not be liable for our failure to keep the premises in repair. We do not believe it exempts defendants
from liability they expressly assumed and with reference
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to a part of the premises for which they had exclusive
liability.
Defendants cited many cases construing similar provisions but none of them were applicable to the facts
here, and none of them relieved a lessor of liability arising out of property over whi~h he had assumed exclusive
and entire control. For instance defendants cited a
number of California cases, but they did not cite a later
case from the Supreme Court of California, Colttmbia
Lab<Orabori.es vs. California Beauty Supply Company,
148 Pac. (2), 15 (1944). In that case the Supreme Court
of California announced principles that do apply to the
case at bar. On page 160 the Supreme Court of California says: "The rule that there is no implied obligation upon the landlord, in the absence of statute, to keep
the demised premises in repair or fit for occupancy,
applies only to the premises actually leased, and does
not operate to free the landlord from liability to the
tenant for injury arising from defects in other portions
of the premises of which the lessor retains possession and
control, (citing cases). In other words, the defendants'
character as landlord does not e~empt them from the
consequences of their own negligence, although the injured party happens to- be their tenant." That case
involved a defective roof from fire occurring without
fault of the landlord which caused the tenants' goods
to be damaged by rain leakage. There was no express
obligation on the part of the landlord to keep the roof
in good condition, but the court held that the landlord
having control of the roof was liable for failing to keep
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it in good condition. Our case is stronger than the California case because here the landlord expressly assumed
entire responsibility for the roof for the entire term
of the lease. The si1nple answer to defendants' argument with reference to paragraph 11 is as indicated, that
we are not c01nplaining of defendants' failure to keep
the roof in repair, we are complaining of defendants'
failure to k~ep the roof in good condition.
Upon general demurrer the original complaint stated
a cause of action as it likewise did after the amendments.
The court erred in sustaining the general demurrers,
and its judgment
of dismissal should be reversed.
.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONE:S,
RICH & STRONG,

Atf)(wnerys fior Plailnti.ffs
and .Appellamts.
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